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CONSTITUTIONAL  
CASES 2001:  
AN OVERVIEW 
Patrick J. Monahan* 
This book, which consists of the papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law 
School’s 5th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 12, 2002, 
examines the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released 
in the calendar year 2001.1 The Court handed down a total of 91 decisions in 
2001, including 19 constitutional decisions.2 This represents the largest number 
of total judgments released by the Supreme Court since 1998, and a significant 
increase from the 72 decisions released in calendar year 2000. It is difficult to 
identify the reason for the increased output in 2001, but one factor may have 
been the fact that for the first time in a number of years, the Court was at full 
strength and had a stable membership.  
                                                                                                                                                              
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1
 A case is considered to be a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the 
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada,” as defined in s. 52 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
 The 19 constitutional decisions in calendar year 2001 were as follows: Dunmore v. On-
tario (Attorney General) (2001), 207 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.); Law Society (British Columbia) 
v. Mangat (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.); Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R 911; 
O.E.C.T.A. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470; R. v. Advance Cutting and 
Coring Ltd. (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dutra, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 759; R. v. 
Golden, (2001), 207 D.L.R. (4th) 18 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hynes (2001), 206 D.L.R. (4th) 483 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3; Ontario v. 974649 Ontario Inc. (2001), 200 D.L.R. 
(4th) 444 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344; R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
687; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; Smith v. Canada, 2001 S.C.C. 88; Therrien (Re), [2001] 2 
S.C.R 3; United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; United States v. Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
587; United States v. Tsioubris, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 613; United States v. Kwok, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
532; United States v. Shulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616. Note that the facts and judgment in Cobb 
and Tsioubris were identical, and so these decisions are treated as a single case. 
ARTICLES 
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The Court was unanimous in 82 percent of its judgments released in 2001, 
including in 79 percent (15/19) of the constitutional cases.3 This rather remark-
able degree of unanimity is the highest in the past 15 years, and confirms the 
fact that Canada’s highest court manifests a much higher degree of consensus 
than its American counterpart (which is unanimous in approximately 40-45 
percent of its appeal judgments). Despite the tendency of commentators to 
focus on differences amongst members of the Court, in this past year in particu-
lar the Court was in broad agreement on the vast majority of matters it decided.  
The Court also dealt with 668 leave applications in 2001, which is a record. 
Almost 200 leave applications were filed from the province of Quebec alone, as 
compared to just 130 Quebec leave applications in 2000. The number of leave 
applications from Ontario and the Federal Court of Appeal declined slightly in 
2001, while the leave applications from the other provinces remained constant.4 
I.  CHARTER CASES 
Of the 19 constitutional cases in 2001, 16 were Charter cases. The Charter 
claimant was successful in 8 of these 16 cases in 2001 which, as Table 1 below 
indicates, equals the highest success rate for Charter claims in the past decade.5 
However, despite fluctuations in the individual yearly outcomes, overall the 
success rate for Charter claims over the past decade has remained relatively 
constant, with approximately one out of every three Charter claims being de-
termined by the Supreme Court of Canada in favour of the claimant. This estab-
lished equilibrium in the outcomes of Charter cases reflects the fact that, with the 
Court now able to largely control its own docket through the process of grant-
ing leave to appeal, it is able to ensure that it only hears cases with a reasonable 
prospect of success.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
 A decision is considered to be unanimous when all members of the Court concur in the re-
sult, even if different reasons are written in support of that result. 
4
 Statistics on leave applications are available from the Court at <www.scc-csc.gc.ca> under 
the link “Information on Cases”. 
5
 A Charter claim is treated as being successful when the claimant receives some form of re-
lief under s. 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, or where a statute or other 
legal rule is declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982. 
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Table 1 
Success Rate of Charter Claimants 
At the Supreme Court of Canada 1991-2001 
 
Year Charter  
Challenges 
Claimant  
Succeeds 
Success Rate 
1991 35 15 43% 
1992 38 12 32% 
1993 42 9 21% 
1994 26 11 42% 
1995 33 8 24% 
1996 35 8 23% 
1997 20 10 50% 
1998 21 8 38% 
1999 14 5 36% 
2000 11 3 27% 
2001 16 8 50% 
TOTAL 291 97 33% 
 
 
A number of the Court’s 2001 Charter decisions received widespread media 
attention, particularly the R. v. Sharpe decision on child pornography in Janu-
ary and the United States v. Burns decision on extradition in February. How-
ever, as the paper in this volume by Osgoode Hall Law School Professor Jamie 
Cameron argues, two of the most significant 2001 Charter decisions from a 
public policy and jurisprudential perspective were the freedom of association 
cases released near the end of the year, Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) 
and R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd.  
1. Fundamental Freedoms and Equality 
In one sense, the contrast between Dunmore and Advance Cutting and Cor-
ing is striking. In Dunmore, the Court ruled that Ontario statutory provisions 
which excluded agricultural workers from a provincial labour relations regime 
were unconstitutional, whereas in Advance Cutting and Coring the Supreme 
Court deferred to the Quebec National Assembly and upheld statutory provi-
sions which required workers in the construction industry in that province to 
become a member in one of five government-recognized employee associa-
tions. The decision in Dunmore can properly be charactered as an activist one 
since, as Justice Robert Sharpe (as he then was) had ruled in a lengthy and 
6  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
reasoned judgment at first instance, the exclusion of agricultural workers from 
the provincial labour relations regime did not prevent such workers from form-
ing an association.6 The complaint of the applicants in Dunmore was that they 
were being denied certain statutory protections that they regarded as essential in 
order to form a trade union.7 However, as Sharpe J. pointed out (and as the 
Ontario Court of Appeal had unanimously agreed),8 these complaints seemed to 
be directed at the private actions of employers rather than the legislative regime 
itself. The Supreme Court of Canada had decided in Dolphin Delivery9 that the 
Charter did not apply to private action, which seemed to suggest that the free-
dom of association claim must necessarily fail on the basis that the limits on the 
applicants’ freedom of association did not arise from government action. 
The Supreme Court decided otherwise, by an 8-1 margin. The majority 
judgment of Bastarache J. concluded that the exclusion of agricultural workers 
from the provincial labour relations scheme had the effect of substantially 
interfering with their right to organize collectively. The Supreme Court agreed 
with the applicants’ argument that, without the protection of the labour rela-
tions regime, agricultural workers had no realistic chance of associating. But 
what of Sharpe J.’s point that this denial of the right to associate was attribut-
able to the private actions of employers rather than of the government or the 
legislature, and thus was not subject to the Charter? While the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning on this point is not entirely clear, Bastarache J. seems to argue that 
the claim is susceptible to Charter review because it is based on both section 
2(d) and section 15 of the Charter.  
Bastarache J. emphasizes in his reasons that the complaint of the applicants 
is that the legislation is “underinclusive,” in the sense that it denies to agricul-
tural workers a benefit or right that is accorded to others. Bastarache J. ac-
knowledges that where a group makes a claim that legislation is underinclusive, 
the normal course is to review such underinclusiveness under section 15(1) 
rather than section 2(d). But, according to Bastarache J., where this underinclu-
siveness results in the violation of freedom of association, that violation may be 
subject to Charter review on the basis of section 2(d) even where the limitations 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
 See Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.), at 206-
207. 
7
 For example, the applicants objected to the fact that agricultural employers were able to 
deny union organizers access to private property to meet with workers to persuade them to join a 
union, as well as to the fact that agricultural workers who attempted to form a trade union might be 
subject to economic reprisals from their employers. 
8
 In a short judgment, Krever J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal, concurred in by Doherty 
and Rosenberg JJ.A., had agreed with the reasons of Sharpe J. See Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney 
General) (1999), 182 D.L.R. (4th) 471 (C.A.).  
9
  R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. 
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on freedom of association arise from the actions of private employers rather 
than the government. How this should be so, given the fact that section 32 
limits the Charter to the actions of the government or legislature, is never 
clearly explained by Bastarache J., although he does comment at one point that 
the “message” of the legislation is to implicitly encourage employers to thwart 
the organizing efforts of their agricultural workers. But Bastarache J. did not 
point to any evidence establishing a causal connection between the enactment 
of the impugned legislation and actions taken by employers. In any event, 
assuming such a causal connection could be established or assumed to exist, 
then surely this in itself would have been sufficient to engage the application of 
the Charter, without having to resort to a novel theory about the application of 
section 2(d) to the actions of private employers in circumstances where legisla-
tion could be said to be underinclusive. 
It is unclear as to how far this novel argument extending the application to 
the Charter in cases of underinclusive legislation will apply in future cases. 
Bastarache J. repeatedly emphasizes the “exceptional” character of the claim in 
this particular case, which leaves the Supreme Court ample room to back away 
from or modify this new line of argument in future cases.10 A much more direct 
and straightforward approach would have been simply to analyze the claim 
under section 15, since there is no doubt that underinclusive legislation is sub-
ject to review under section 15. Yet the Court may have felt itself unable to 
pursue this obvious and direct route because of the highly complicated and 
unsatisfactory character of the Court’s equality rights jurisprudence under 
section 15. In fact, as Sonia Lawrence points out in her commentary on section 
15(1) jurisprudence at the Supreme Court of Canada this past year, the Court’s 
section 15 test as set forth in the 1999 decision in Law v. Canada11 is increas-
ingly seen as problematic. In particular, the requirement that legislation be 
found to demean “human dignity” before a section 15 violation can be estab-
lished is not only highly subjective, but it seems to narrow unduly the scope of 
the equality guarantee.12 In fact, as Lawrence points out in her commentary, the 
Court’s divided decision in Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service Commission), 
                                                                                                                                                              
10
 For example, in para. 22 Bastarache J. states that legislation that is underinclusive may “in 
unique contexts, substantially impact the exercise of a constitutional freedom” (emphasis added); in 
para. 28, Bastarache J. notes that such claims will not be common, while in para. 30, he describes 
such claims as “rare” [Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General, supra, note 2]. 
11
 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
12
 A much more straightforward approach would be to declare that legislation that imposes 
differential treatment on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground is presumptively contrary 
to s. 15, and must be justified under s. 1. For an analysis along these lines, see the judgment of 
McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. 
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released in early 2002,13 is the first indication that some members of the Court 
may be sufficiently unhappy with the Law test such that they may be prepared 
to revisit it in the future.  
If Dunmore took a broad view of the associational claim in that particular 
case, the decision in Advance Cutting and Coring indicated that the Court is 
still seriously divided as to the overall meaning of the guarantee of freedom of 
association in section 2(d). At issue in Advance Cutting and Coring was Que-
bec legislation which required workers in the construction industry in Quebec 
to join one of five government-recognized trade unions. While the Court ulti-
mately upheld the legislation on the basis that the legislation’s infringement of 
section 2(d) could be upheld as a reasonable limit under section 1, there were 
four separate opinions written, and none of them commanded the support of a 
majority of the Court.  
The Court did affirm, by an 8-1 margin, the principle that section 2(d) in-
cludes a negative right not to associate, in addition to a positive right to associ-
ate.14 However, the eight members of the Court who accepted this proposition 
did so for three separate sets of reasons, written by LeBel J. (for himself, 
Gonthier and Arbour JJ.), Bastarache J. (for himself, McLachlin C.J., Major 
and Binnie JJ.) and Iacobucci J. on his own behalf. Moreover, each of the three 
opinions on this point adopted a different formulation of the circumstances in 
which a negative right not to associate will be engaged by legislation or gov-
ernment action. The opinion of Bastarache J., which was supported by four 
members of the Court, seemed to suggest that a requirement to join a trade 
union was necessarily a form of ideological coercion that violated section 2(d), 
given the nature of trade unions as participatory bodies holding political and 
economic roles in society. In contrast, LeBel J., whose opinion was supported 
by a total of three members of the Court, argued that a requirement to join a 
trade union violated section 2(d) only where there was evidence that the par-
ticular unions involved had ideologically coerced their members. Since there 
was no such evidence in the record, in LeBel J.’s view the freedom of associa-
tion claim failed. Finally, Iacobucci J. argued in his opinion that where the state 
obliges an association of individuals whose affiliation is already compelled by 
the “facts of life” (such as through a common workplace), there is no violation 
of freedom of association, provided that the compelled association “furthers the 
common good.” However, in Iacobucci J.’s view the compelled trade union 
membership in this case was not shown to further the common good, since 
                                                                                                                                                              
13
 [2002] SCC 23. 
14
 Only L’Heureux-Dubé J. dissented on this point, with the judgments of LeBel, Bastarache 
and Iacobucci JJ. for the other eight members of the Court affirming this principle, which had 
previously been recognized in Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211. 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Constitutional Cases 2001: An Overview 9 
 
 
union membership was not linked to any competency requirement and there 
was a clear violation of workers’ liberty interests. In the result, the Court ruled 
by a narrow 5-4 majority that the compelled membership in a trade union in 
this particular case violated section 2(d), with the majority consisting of Basta-
rache J. (and three others) and Iacobucci J.  
On section 1, Bastarache J. would have found the legislation to be an unjusti-
fied infringement of freedom of association and would have ruled the relevant 
statutory provisions to be invalid.15 But Iacobucci J. parted company with 
Bastarache J. on the section 1 issue, with Iacobucci J. agreeing with LeBel J. 
that the legislation was adopted “within a unique and complex historical context 
. . . to promote distinct social and economic objectives that were, and remain, 
pressing and substantial.”16 The Court was thus evenly divided 4-4 on whether 
the legislation could be upheld as a reasonable limit under section 1.17 Since 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. had found that there was no violation of section 2(d) in the 
first place (on the basis that section 2(d) did not include a right not to associ-
ate), in the result the legislation was upheld as valid.  
While the reasoning in Advance Cutting and Coring failed to clarify the 
scope of section 2(d), it did reflect the Supreme Court’s continuing caution with 
respect to cases originating from the province of Quebec. As Table 2 below 
indicates, over the past five years, the Court has ruled Quebec legislation or 
government action to be unconstitutional on two occasions, Reference re Seces-
sion of Quebec18 and Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General).19 Yet in both in-
stances, the Court’s opinion was carefully circumscribed and tailored so as to 
avoid any appearance of thwarting the prerogatives or jurisdiction of the Que-
bec government or National Assembly. In Libman, for example, the Court 
struck down a provision which prohibited spending by independent third parties 
in a provincial referendum campaign. At the same time the Court went out of 
its way to indicate that substitute legislation permitting very modest third party 
expenditures would likely be constitutionally valid, and the Quebec National 
Assembly followed up this suggestion by enacting such legislation. In Refer-
ence re Secession of Quebec the Court did rule that Quebec’s unilateral seces-
sion from Canada was not authorized by the Canadian Constitution, but it also 
declared that a clear majority vote on a clear referendum question on secession 
                                                                                                                                                              
15
 Bastarache J. would have suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of 18 months 
to permit the government to consider amendments to its legislation. See Advance Cutting and 
Coring, supra, note 2, at para. 52. 
16
 Ibid., at para. 290. 
17
 The ninth member of the Court, L’Heureux-Dubé J., did not find it necessary to deal with 
s. 1 since in her view there was no violation of s. 2(d). 
18
 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
19
 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569. 
10  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
would give rise to a constitutional duty on the Canadian government and the 
governments of the other provinces to negotiate the terms of secession in good 
faith. This argument was not raised by the amicus curiae and appeared to have 
been developed by the Court e propio motu.20 
                                                                                                                                                              
20
 See Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession 
Reference” (1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65. 
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TABLE 2 
Supreme Court Decisions Declaring Statutes or  
Regulations Unconstitutional, 1997-200121 
 
2001 Constitutional  
Provision 
Result 
Dunmore v. Ontario  
(Attorney General) (2001), 207 
D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.). 
Charter, s. 2(d) Exclusion of agricultural workers from 
Ontario Labour Relations Act violates s. 
2(d). 
Law Society (British Colum-
bia) v. Mangat (2001), 205 
D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.). 
Federalism, 
paramountcy 
Provincial Legal Profession Act inoperative 
as it applies to non-lawyers acting before 
the Immigration and Refugee Board due to 
conflict with paramount federal legislation 
R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
687. 
Charter, s. 7 Statutory defence of duress, as described by 
s. 17 of the Criminal Code, held to violate 
s. 7 for failure to allow for persons not 
acting with moral voluntariness. 
R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
45.   
Charter, s. 2(b)  Exceptions read into s. 163.1(4) of Criminal 
Code to save provision under s. 1. 
2000   
Little Sisters Book & Art 
Emporium v. Canada (Minister 
of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
1120. 
Charter, s. 2(b) Section 152(3) of Customs Act, placing the 
onus on an importer of expressive material 
to justify importation, violates s. 2(b) of the 
Charter. 
1999   
R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 
S.C.R. 393. 
Aboriginal, s. 35, 
Constitution Act, 
1930 
Provincial Park regulations (Saskatchewan) 
inapplicable due to conflict with treaty 
rights.  
Westbank First Nation v. 
British Columbia Hydro & 
Power Authority, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 134. 
Federalism, s. 125, 
Constitution Act, 
1867 [“C.A. 
1867”] 
Indian Band taxation by-laws inapplicable 
to provincial utility due to s. 125 of C.A. 
1867. 
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister 
of Indian & Northern 
Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203. 
Charter, s. 15  Exclusion of off-reserve band members 
from voting privileges by s. 77(1) Indian 
Act violates s. 15 of Charter. 
M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. Charter, s. 15 Definition of spouse in Ontario Family Law 
Act violates 15(1). 
M & D Farm Ltd. v. Mani-
toba Agricultural Credit 
Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961. 
Federalism, 
paramountcy  
Provincial Court order obtained pursuant to 
Family Farm Protection Act (Manitoba) 
invalid due to conflict with paramount 
federal legislation.  
U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. 
KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 1083. 
Charter, s. 2(b) Overbroad definition of picketing in Indus-
trial Relations Act of New Brunswick 
violates s. 2(b). 
 
1999 (cont’d) Constitutional  
Provision 
Result 
12  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 456. 
21
 
Aboriginal, s. 35  Federal fisheries regulations interfere with 
treaty right to fish, not applicable to the 
accused. 
1998    
Eurig Estate (Re), [1998] 2 
S.C.R. 565.  
Federalism, s. 53, 
C.A. 1867 
Regulation under the Ontario Administra-
tion of Justice Act providing for probate 
fees ruled unconstitutional 
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 493. 
Charter, s. 15 Provincial human rights code unconstitu-
tional for failing to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Thomson Newspapers v. 
Canada (Attorney General), 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877. 
Charter, s. 2(b) Provision in Canada Election Act prohibit-
ing publication of polls for 72 hours prior to 
election date ruled invalid. 
R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 
439. 
Charter, s. 2(b) Part of defamatory libel provision in 
Criminal Code ruled unconstitutional as an 
unjustified limit on free expression. 
1997   
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), 
[1997] 3 S.C.R 844. 
Charter, s. 7 Residency requirement by municipality of 
Longueuil ruled an unconstitutional in-
fringement of liberty under s. 7. 
Reference Re Remuneration 
of Judges of the Provincial 
Court of Prince Edward 
Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
Charter, s. 11 
and Federalism 
(preamble) 
Legislation reducing salaries of provincial 
court judges in three provinces ruled 
unconstitutional as infringing judicial 
independence; provinces required to set up 
independent commissions to make recom-
mendations as to provincial court salaries.   
Libman v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
569. 
Charter, s. 2(b) Spending limits in Quebec referendum 
legislation ruled unconstitutional limit on 
freedom of expression. 
Benner v. Canada (Secretary 
of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
358. 
Charter, s. 15 Provision in federal Citizenship Act requir-
ing children born abroad of a Canadian 
mother prior to 1977 to undergo a security 
check ruled unconstitutional as a violation 
of equality rights. 
Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010. 
Aboriginal, s. 35 B.C. legislation cannot extinguish Aborigi-
nal title in B.C. 
                                                                                                                                                              
21
  Cases in bold denote federal statutes or regulations.  Table includes all constitutional cases 
(including Charter, federalism and Aboriginal). 
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In Advance Cutting and Coring, the opinions of LeBel J. and Iacobucci J. re-
flected extreme caution on the part of the Court in reviewing a deliberate and 
relatively recent policy choice of the Quebec National Assembly. Both opinions 
emphasized the fact that the legislation at issue reflected complex and difficult 
trade-offs that had been made by the Quebec National Assembly, and that this 
policy determination was therefore entitled to substantial judicial deference. 
LeBel J. in particular also argued that federalism considerations militated in 
favour of the validity of the legislation, since the scheme was a product of the 
particular historical experience of Quebec’s labour relations regime and “this 
Court’s approach to . . . federalism accepts the legislative solutions specific to 
each province.”22 Thus an important ingredient leading to the result in Advance 
Cutting must surely have been the Court’s reluctance to tamper with an impor-
tant social and political compromise that seemed to have worked tolerably well 
in the province of Quebec for an extended period of time.  
2. Other Charter Cases 
There were two other Charter cases in 2001 in which statutory provisions 
were ruled unconstitutional, but neither had the impact or significance of Dun-
more. In the high-profile case of Sharpe, the Court ruled that the existing 
Criminal Code23 provisions prohibiting the possession of child pornography 
were overly broad, but the Court then went on to “read in” a number of narrow 
exceptions to the legislation in order to render it valid. At a subsequent trial 
held in early 2002, Sharpe was convicted of possession of child pornography on 
the basis of the Criminal Code provisions as amended by the Court.24 The other 
2001 case which struck down a statutory provision was Ruzic, where the Su-
preme Court ruled that section 17 of the Criminal Code, which defined the 
defence of duress, violated section 7 and could not be justified under section 1. 
But this merely had the effect of substituting the common law defence, which 
was only slightly broader than the statutory version of the defence.25  
                                                                                                                                                              
22
 Advance Cutting and Coring, supra, note 2, at para. 276. 
23
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
24
 See R. v. Sharpe, [2002] B.C.J. No. 610 (S.C.), online: QL (BCJ). 
25
 Section 17 of the Criminal Code [am. R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 40(2) (Sch. I, item 
1)] was found to be unconstitutional in that it only permitted an accused to invoke the defence of 
duress when compelled to commit an offence under threats of immediate bodily harm from a 
person who was present when the offence was committed. The Court found that this was a violation 
of s. 7 of the Charter, since it would permit the conviction of a person who committed an offence 
because of threats of death or serious bodily harm, if the individual making the threats was not 
present at the scene of the crime, or if the threats of harm were not immediate. The common law 
defence, which did not have these criteria of immediacy and presence, was found not to have been 
14  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Challenges to government decisions or actions (as opposed to statutes or 
regulations) succeeded in five Charter cases in 2001, including Burns, in which 
the Court found that the Minister of Justice’s decision to extradite an accused to 
the United States without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not 
be imposed violated section 7 of the Charter.26 While highly symbolic, the 
impact of Burns will likely be limited to the extradition context. The Court’s 
analysis of the meaning of the “principles of fundamental justice” under section 
7 in Burns does not appear to have broken any new ground, and was very much 
focussed on the concerns that have arisen in recent years over the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty. While there are certain statements in the case sug-
gesting that any attempt to re-institute the death penalty in Canada might well 
violate the Charter, there seems little practical likelihood of any such initiative 
being advanced by the Canadian government in the foreseeable future. Indeed, 
as the Court itself emphasized in its reasons, the dominant international trend is 
towards abolition, rather than retention or expansion of the use of the death 
penalty.  
II.  ABORIGINAL CASES IN 2001 
In Mitchell v. M.N.R., the only Supreme Court Aboriginal rights case of 
2001, the Court found that Mohawk Canadians of Akwesasne did not have a 
constitutionally protected Aboriginal right to bring goods across the Canada-
U.S. border free of customs duty. As the two commentaries on the case in-
cluded in this volume explain,27 Mitchell is significant for a number of reasons. 
First, while Mitchell himself had defined the Aboriginal right in question as the 
right to bring three categories of goods across the border for limited trade with 
certain Aboriginal partners, the Supreme Court rejected this characterization 
and held, instead, that the right at issue was simply the right to bring goods 
across the border “for purposes of trade.”28 The majority judgment of McLach-
                                                                                                                                                              
superseded by the statutory defence and was accordingly substituted by the Court for the invalid s. 
17. 
26
 See the commentaries by Martin, “Extradition, the Charter and Due Process” and by Young, 
“Fundamental Justice and Political Power,” included in this volume. In addition to Burns, challenges 
to government action succeeded in the following: Golden (holding that a strip search performed at a 
restaurant was unreasonable); 974649 Ontario Inc. (holding that a justice of the peace has the power to 
order costs against the Crown); and Cobb, Tsioubris, Kwok and Shulman, all of which held that 
extradition proceedings should be stayed due to the improper conduct of U.S. government officials. 
27
 See Hutchins and Choksi, “From Calder to Mitchell” and Christie, “The Court’s Exercise 
of Plenary Power.” 
28
 See the judgment of McLachlin C.J., concurred in by Gonthier, Iacobucci, Arbour and LeBel 
JJ. [Mitchell v. M.N.R., supra, note 2]. Binnie J. wrote a separate concurring opinion (concurred in by 
Major J.) which agreed with the reasons of the Chief Justice and added separate reasons of his own. 
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lin C.J. argued that the right should be characterized in this manner due to the 
nature of the ancestral practice relied on as well as the governmental legislation 
with which it conflicted. But perhaps the most telling point was the practical 
one. If Chief Mitchell was allowed to bring goods across the border, for spe-
cific or limited purposes without the payment of duty, there would be no means 
of enforcing these limitations; once the goods were across the border they could 
be traded with anyone for any purpose. Thus the proposed limitations on the 
scope of the Aboriginal right to transport goods across the border would in prac-
tice prove illusory, which was a key consideration that led the Court to character-
ize the right more broadly as simply the right to transport goods across the border 
for trade.29  
Mitchell is also significant for the comments of the Court on the admissibil-
ity and use of evidence in Aboriginal cases, particularly oral histories. The 
Court in Delgamuukw30 had held that oral histories of Aboriginal peoples were 
admissible and had to be given appropriate weight in the fact-finding process. 
But in Mitchell the  
 
Court placed some important qualifiers on the use of oral histories. First, the 
Court stated that oral histories are not automatically admissible, but have to 
satisfy tests of usefulness and reasonable reliability.31 Second, even where 
admissible, the reliance on oral histories must not negate the operation of “gen-
eral evidentiary principles,” with the Court noting that “[t]here is a boundary 
that must not be crossed between a sensitive application and a complete aban-
donment of the rules of evidence.”32 According to the Court, claims of Aborigi-
nal rights must be supported by “cogent evidence establishing their validity on 
a balance of probabilities,” and “[s]parse, doubtful and equivocal evidence 
cannot serve as the foundation for a successful claim.”33 The Court went on to 
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s finding 
                                                                                                                                                              
Thus the reasons of the Chief Justice appear to have enjoyed the support of all seven members of the 
Court who participated in the appeal. 
29
 Ibid., at para. 20. This concern over the practical consequences of recognition of an Abo-
riginal right has not always been addressed directly by the Supreme Court. The discussion of these 
practical concerns in Mitchell may well be a reflection of the experience of the Court following the 
decision in R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (“Marshall No. 1”), in which the recognition of an 
Aboriginal right to fish for eels led to a wide variety of claims by Aboriginal peoples to exploit 
natural resources in Atlantic Canada. The Court subsequently issued a clarification of its views in 
R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [“Marshall No. 2”], in which it was pointed out that the initial 
decision could not necessarily be applied in these rather different contexts. 
30
 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
31
 Mitchell v. M.N.R., supra, note 2, at para. 33. 
32
 Ibid., at paras. 38, 39. 
33
 Ibid., at para. 51. 
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that the Mohawks had an ancestral practice of transporting goods across the St. 
Lawrence River for the purposes of trade. While findings of fact are entitled to 
deference from an appellate court, the trial judge’s findings in this case repre-
sented a “palpable and overriding error” warranting the substitution of a differ-
ent result.  
The Supreme Court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish 
an Aboriginal right to transport goods across the Canada-U.S. border for pur-
poses of trade was sufficient in itself to dispose of the appeal. But two members 
of the Court, Binnie and Major JJ., went on to consider and to accept an alter-
native argument advanced by the Crown which would have precluded recogni-
tion of the right claimed in any event.34 This argument was that the doctrine of 
“sovereign incompatibility” continued to exist in Canadian constitutional law 
despite the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,35 and that 
the application of this doctrine precluded the recognition of a right to enter 
Canada free of a requirement to pay duty. While acknowledging that the doc-
trine of sovereign incompatibility had in the past been applied in an overly 
expansive manner by the Courts, with the result that Aboriginal rights were 
unduly narrowed or deemed to have been extinguished, Binnie J. affirmed that 
the doctrine remains an element of the Canadian constitutional order. Binnie J. 
went on to conclude that an essential attribute of state sovereignty is the right to 
control who will enter the state’s territory. Since the Aboriginal right claimed in 
this case was inconsistent with this key aspect of Canadian sovereignty, the 
right in question must be held to have been extinguished by the assertion of 
British sovereignty in North America. The acceptance of this argument, even if 
only by two members of the Court, must be counted as a major new develop-
ment in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence; the existing test for the recognition and 
application of Aboriginal rights, as stated in Van der Peet,36 makes no reference 
whatever to the doctrine of sovereign incompatibility as a means whereby 
Aboriginal rights can be extinguished.37 
In general terms, what is most striking about all of these various doctrinal 
developments in Mitchell is the evident desire on the part of the Court to nar-
row or limit certain aspects of the more expansive doctrines favouring Aborigi-
                                                                                                                                                              
34
 The judgment of McLachlin C.J. expressly refused to comment on the argument relating 
to “sovereign incompatibility” that was discussed and accepted by Binnie J. See ibid., at para. 64. 
35
 The doctrine of sovereign incompatibility involves the claim that the assertion of sover-
eignty by the European powers in North America was necessarily incompatible with the survival 
and continuation of Aboriginal rights. See the judgment of  
Binnie J., ibid., at para. 67. 
36
 See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
37
 See Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000), 79 Can. Bar Rev. 
196. 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Constitutional Cases 2001: An Overview 17 
 
 
nal rights put forward in cases such as Delgamuukw and Marshall No. 1.38 
What Mitchell indicates is that the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal 
rights under section 35(1) must not be construed in such a way that compro-
mises the practical and effective enforcement of Canadian laws. This carries 
forward and reinforces the tendency reflected in the Court’s opinion in Mar-
shall No. 2,39 where the Court had sought to limit the scope and potential appli-
cation of the principles announced in Marshall No. 1. Of course, Mitchell was 
released prior to the events of September 11, 2001, and the events of that day 
can be expected to reinforce the sentiments expressed by the Court in Mitchell.  
III.  FEDERALISM DOCTRINE AT THE SUPREME COURT  
OF CANADA 
There were three federalism cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in 2001: Mangat (ruling that the federal Immigration Act40 is inconsistent with 
and paramount over B.C.’s Legal Profession Act),41 Therrien (Re) (upholding 
provisions in Quebec’s Courts of Justice Act42 permitting the removal of judges 
of the Court of Quebec);43 and the O.E.C.T.A. case (upholding a new scheme 
for school funding in Ontario).44 The federalism docket in 2001 reflects the 
tendency of the recent past, in which constitutional litigation has increasingly 
focussed on Charter and Aboriginal issues, as opposed to federalism concerns. 
Indeed, as Table 3 below indicates, over the past five years, there has been a 
total of just 15 federalism cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
These numbers are reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s and are a far cry from 
the early 1980s, the high-water mark of federalism litigation at the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the past 50 years, when the Court was deciding an average 
of over 11 federalism cases annually. 
TABLE 3 
Federalism Cases at the SCC 1950-200145 
 
TIME PERIOD FEDERALISM 
CASES 
TOTAL 
CASES 
AVERAGE 
                                                                                                                                                              
38
 See supra, note 29. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
  R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2. 
41
  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 255. 
42
  R.S.Q. c. T-16. 
43
 See the commentary by Sharpe included in this volume on this case. 
44
 See the commentary by Hogg included in this volume on this case. 
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1950-59 30 651 3/year — 4.6% of total 
1960-69 36 1161 3.6/year — 3.1% of total 
1970-79 54 1464 5.4/year — 3.7% of total 
1980-84 57 524 11.4/year — 10.9% of total 
1997-2001 15        43845 3/year — 3.4% of total 
The success of the federal government in federalism litigation at the Su-
preme Court of Canada in the recent past is also noteworthy. There have been 
only two federal statutes whose validity has been challenged on federalism 
grounds before the Supreme Court of Canada over the past five years, and in 
both instances the federal statute was upheld as valid.46 In contrast, a total of ten 
provincial statutes or government actions were challenged before the Supreme 
Court of Canada over the past five years, and the challenge was successful on 
four occasions.47 Two of those cases involved paramountcy arguments, in 
which the Court found that provincial legislation was inoperative due to con-
flict with paramount federal legislation;48 this confirms a newfound willingness 
on the part of the Court to invoke paramountcy considerations as a basis for 
                                                                                                                                                              
45
 The 15 federalism decisions (i.e., cases in which a provision of the Constitution Act, 1867 
[(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5] was the basis of the decision) 
released by the Court from January 1, 1997 until December 31, 2001 are as follows: Germain v. 
Montreal (City), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1144; Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) [1997] 2 
S.C.R. 581; R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213;  Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National 
Energy Board), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; Eurig 
Estate (Re), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565; Consortium Developments (Clearwater) Ltd. v. Sarnia (City), 
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 3; M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961; 
Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 134; Global 
Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494; Reference re 
Firearms Act (Canada), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783; Public School Boards’ Assn. (Alberta) v. Alberta 
(Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 409; O.E.C.T.A. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 470; Therrien (Re), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3; Law Society (British Columbia) v. Mangat (2001), 
205 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.). 
46
 See R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (upholding provisions of the Canadian En-
vironmental Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 16) and Reference re Firearms Act, [2000] 
1 S.C.R. 783 (upholding the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39). A third case involving federal juris-
diction, Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322, upheld 
the jurisdiction of the National Energy Board over a gas pipeline undertaking but did not involve 
the validity of a statutory provision.  
47
 See Eurig Estate (Re), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note 
18; M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961; and Mangat, 
supra, note 2. 
48
 In addition to Mangat, ibid., a paramountcy argument succeeded in M & D Farm Ltd., 
ibid. 
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limiting the operation of provincial laws.49  In these instances, however, the 
Court is merely giving effect to statutes enacted by Parliament, as opposed to 
attempting to limit provincial jurisdiction on the basis of the Court’s own inter-
pretation of the open-ended categories in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867. In general terms, it is evident that federalism litigation is today much 
less significant, both in terms of the numbers of cases as well as their practical 
impact, than was the case 20 years ago.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In addition to tracking and analyzing the Supreme Court’s constitutional ju-
risprudence in 2001, the papers in this volume also consider a number of 
broader issues and developments that have occupied both the Supreme Court 
and Canadian governments in recent years. The paper by Supreme Court Jus-
tice Louis LeBel considers the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on interna-
tional law and international legal principles in the development of Canadian 
domestic law, while Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Robert Sharpe considers 
the manner in which the Court has interpreted and applied the principle of 
judicial independence in recent years. The papers by Morris Rosenberg and by 
David Sgayias of the federal Department of Justice consider remedial issues 
that have arisen in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, while Mark Fre-
iman, the Deputy Attorney General of Ontario, reflects on the impact that the 
Charter has on the role of the Attorney General as chief legal adviser to the 
Crown. Geoffrey Cowper and Lorne Sossin explore a neglected topic in Cana-
dian constitutional law, the role of a political questions doctrine, arguing that 
our own Supreme Court might benefit by having regard to the manner in which 
such a doctrine has been developed in the United States. David Paciocco pro-
vides a thoughtful contribution on the impact that the newly-enacted Anti-
terrorism Act50 is likely to have on the interpretation and application of funda-
mental constitutional norms in the years ahead. 
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 Earlier indications of this new attitude can be found in Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 121 and Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453. 
50
  S.C. 2001, c. 41. 
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Table 4 
Dissents51 in Constitutional Cases on the McLachlin Court 
January 1, 2000-January 28, 2002 
 
Justice Dissents  
(Dissents Authored) 
Direction of Dissent 
— favoured 
Claim/Challenge 
Direction of Dissent 
— Opposed 
Claim/Challenge 
McLachlin C.J 4 dissents 
(authored none) 
3 1 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. 1 dissent 
(authored none) 
0 1 
Gonthier J. 1 dissent  
(authored none) 
0 1 
Iacobucci J. 3 dissents  
(authored 1) 
3 0 
Major J. 4 dissents  
(authored 3) 
3 1 
Bastarache J. 2 dissents  
(authored 2) 
1 1 
Binnie J. 3 dissents  
(authored 0) 
3 0 
Arbour J. 5 dissents  
(authored 2) 
5 0 
LeBel J. 2 dissents  
(authored 1) 
2 0 
 
Looking ahead, over the next 12 months two new members will be joining 
the Court, replacing recently retired Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé and Justice 
Charles Gonthier (the latter scheduled to retire in mid-2003). Following the 
retirement of Gonthier J. there is only one more retirement from the Supreme 
Court expected over the next decade, that of Justice Major scheduled for 2006. 
This suggests that the membership on the Court may well be entering a period 
of relative stability that could stretch throughout the next decade. 
It also suggests that the selection of these two new members of the Court in 
2002-2003 could well be pivotal for the shape of the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence. As Table 4 indicates, the retiring justices, L’Heureux-Dubé and 
Gonthier JJ., have tended to be more supportive of government claims in cases 
based on sections 7-14 of the Charter than have most of their colleagues. 
(Moreover, in the initial two years following the appointment of Beverley 
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 Dissents are cases in which at least one member of the Court would have disposed of some 
part of the case differently; thus concurrences in the result are not counted as dissents. During the 
relevant period, the Court was unanimous in 26/35 constitutional cases (74%). Breakdown of cases 
in which there were dissents is as follows: an 8-1 split occurred in 2 cases; a 6-3 split in 1 case; a 5-
2 split in 2 cases; and a 5-4 split in 4 cases. 
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McLachlin as Chief Justice in January 2000, L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ. 
dissented in just one constitutional case.) In contrast, Chief Justice McLachlin 
as well as Justices Arbour, Binnie and Major have dissented more frequently in 
constitutional cases over this time period, with their dissents overwhelmingly 
favouring Charter claimants as opposed to government. Certain commentators 
have already remarked on the fact that the Canadian Supreme Court has given a 
relatively robust interpretation to the criminal rights guarantees in the Charter.52 
Depending on the attitudes of the two new Court appointees from Quebec, we 
could well see a shift in the Court’s approach even more in the direction of 
Charter claimants, particularly in criminal rights cases, than has been the case 
in the past. 
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 See, for example, Hogg’s commentary on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the guar-
antee against unreasonable search and seizure in s. 8 in Constitutional Law of Canada (1997), at s. 
45.4. 
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